Changes in investors' risk attitudes have been used to explain diverse phenomena in asset markets. And yet, popular indicators of changes in risk appetite typically have scant foundation in theory, and give contradictory signals in practice. The question is which one of them, if any, captures changes in investors' risk attitudes. The author, building on the work of Kumar and Persaud (2003) and Misina (2003) , proposes a method of computing the index of risk appetite that satisfies theoretical conditions which ensure that it indeed captures these changes. This index is then used to evaluate commonly held views regarding the behaviour of risk attitudes during various financial episodes over the last 20 years, investigate the behaviour of 'safe haven assets', and assess some risk appetite indices used in practice.
Introduction
Investors' newsletters and daily reports are replete with stories of changing investors' ''risk appetite'' and suggestions as to the best way to benefit from these changes. Part of the difficulty with these stories is that it is often unclear what exactly is meant by ''risk appetite.'' Broadly speaking, ''risk appetite'' seems to be a stand-in for market sentiment, but at this level of generality the concept is hard to operationalize. More precise meaning can be attached to the concept, but there are various possibilities:
-risk appetite refers to investors' risk aversion -risk appetite simply means demand for risky assets -risk appetite refers to the quantity of risky assets demanded.
The second and third interpretations, while plausible, lead to non-informative statements about market developments, implying that asset prices have changed because demand for (quantity demanded of) risky assets has changed. Causes of changes in demand (quantity demanded) are not specified. From the point of view of mapping this concept into an asset pricing model, the first interpretation seems to be the easiest.
However, this interpretation implies that, if practitioners' explanations are to be taken seriously, agent's utility function is not constant, given that their attitudes towards risk are allowed to change.
1 Since constant preferences are thought of as safeguarding rigour in academic research, the allusions to non-constant preferences are typically frowned upon in academic circles.
1 Endogenously changing risk attitudes can be accommodated within the standard framework. Habit persistence utility functions deliver risk attitude that depends on surplus consumption and changes over time as surplus consumption changes. This mechanism, however, is typically found unsatisfactory, given that practitioners use chaning risk attitudes to explain sudden movements in asset prices, or a shorter-term phenomena. Gai and Vause (2004) and Misina (2005) tackle this difficulty by distinguishing between risk aversion, which is assumed to be constant, and risk appetite which is allowed to vary over time. Gai and Vause (2004) postulate that ''risk aversion is part of the intrinsic make-up of the investor and is a parameter that does not change markedly, or frequently, over time.'' Risk appetite, on the other hand, is ''somewhat more than the notion of risk aversion'', and ''shifts periodically as investors respond to episodes of financial distress and macroeconomic uncertainty.'' 2 Misina (2005) differentiates between investors' risk attitude as specified in theoretical models by the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of risk aversion, and the risk attitude implied by agents' actions. To describe the latter, the notion of implied risk aversion is introduced in the standard expected utility framework. Implied risk aversion can change over time. Morover, the paper characterizes the change as a function of agents' future outlook. In this way, the requirement of constant risk attitudes is reconciled with observed behaviour that seem to indicate otherwise.
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This may clarify conceptual issues, but there are practical problems. Identification of changes in risk appetite usually relies on some type of in-house index that is purported to capture investors' changing attitude towards risk. Practitioners use a wide variety of risk appetite indices, yet, as the recent survey by Illing and Aaron (2005) shows, these indices give contradictory signals even though they are presumably capturing the same phenomenon. Depending on which indicator is used, it is possible to conclude that the same price change was due to either increasing or decreasing appetite for risk! These findings raise the question of which one of them, if any, in fact captures changing risk appetite. More generally, is it possible to disentangle the effect of changes in risk and risk attitudes?
Part of the answer to this question, at a theoretical level, was provided by Misina (2003) . Starting from a broad class of asset pricing models, the paper identifies the key condition needed to ensure that a particular index of changes in investors' risk appetite, introduced by Kumar and Persaud (2003) , will distinguish between changes in risk appetite and asset riskiness. The key condition needed to break the 'observational equivalence' is that cross-correlations of asset returns be zero, which implies a diagonal variance/covariance matrix of asset returns. The condition is arguably unlikely to be satisfied in practice, especially if attention is limited to financial assets. 4 Moreover, even if one suceeds in finding two assets whose returns are uncorrelated, it would seem that the chances of finding an uncorrelated portfolio decrease significantly with each new addition of the asset.
The present work builds directly on that work and constructs a benchmark index of risk appetite that satisfies the key condition identified in that paper. The approach we take in based on the observation that although the requirement of zero-covariances among returns may be a strong one when the original returns data are used, one can reverse the procedure and transform the original data in such a way that the requirement of zero correlation is achieved. In other words, we propose to generate a new data set from the original data, in such a way that the desired property is satisfied. The rank correlation measure of risk appetite, based on the same method as in Kumar and Persaud 4 Broadening our horizon to real assets may improve the chances of success somewhat but it is questionable how returns on these are to be measured. One might be tempted to argue that looking at both bonds and equity increases our chances of finding a portfolio with diagonal variance-covariance matrix but this need not be the case. Whereas returns on stocks and bonds should not be positively correlated, the same argument does not imply a zero correlation but rather a negative correlation. (2003) , is then computed on the transformed data set rather than on the original one.
Since the key condition is satisfied in transformed data, changes in the RAI would now indicate changing risk appetite. Our index can thus be used as a benchmark against which other risk appetite indices are to be assessed. As part of the assessment, we compare our index to the original Global Risk Appetite Index (GRAI) of Kumar and Persaud (2003) as well as other risk appetite indices. We also provide the evidence on the behaviour of risk appetite in major financial episodes over the last 20 years.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review the results given in Misina (2003) that motivate the rest of the paper. In Section 3 we discuss the data transformation proposed, the interpretation of the transformed data, and the relationship of this method to the APT model. In Section 4 we present the results, and compare our index with other indices in current use. Performance of the index in major financial episodes is investigated as well. The final section of the paper concludes.
Necessity of Independent Returns
Suppose an analyst observes a change in prices of assets in a protfolio, and tries to infer whether it was due to a change in riskiness of some assets, or to a change in investors' risk appetite. For this task to be feasible, one must assume that these two different causes of asset price changes will not be observationally equivalent. In other words, it must be assumed that these two causes will result in different behaviour of asset prices. Kumar and Persaud (2003) introduce the following distinction: changes in investors risk appetite should impact all assets in the portfolio in proportion to their degree of riskiness.
On the other hand changes in riskiness of any particular asset would not have systemic effects on returns of other assets in the portfolio. Kumar and Persaud then propose rank correlation of excess returns and asset riskiness as a measure that would capture these effects. In particular, positive rank correlation would indicate that a change in prices is due to changes in risk appetite, while a zero correlation would indicate a change in prices due to changes in riskiness of a particular asset.
The soundness of the proposed measure hinges on the validity of the distinction.
Is the proposed distinction valid? Misina (2003) identifies the conditions under which the answer to the question is positive. In that paper, the intuition offered by Kumar and Persaud is summarized in the following propositions: 5 Proposition 2.1 A change in investors' risk appetite will have monotonic effects on assets in different risk classes: the impact on returns will depend on the riskiness of a particular asset.
Proposition 2.2 A change in the riskiness of an asset will not have monotonic effects on excess returns across different asset classses. The impact on returns will not depend on the riskiness of a particular asset.
Letting R ex k denote the excess return on a risky asset, ½ the coefficient of investors' risk aversion, and ¹ k a measure of the riskiness of an asset in class k, Proposition 1 states that, when there is a change in risk aversion, there will be a rank effect,
when the risk aversion increases, and the opposite effect when it decreases. Quantitatively, this effect can be captured by the rank correlation. Proposition 2 states that this effect will not emerge when riskiness of assets changes.
The question is whether these propositions can be derived within a well-specified asset pricing model. The answer is positive. Using a simple consumption-based asset- ::: ¾ 1;K :::
In this setting, Proposition 1 can be proved without imposing any further restrictions. The effect of changes in risk aversion is given by
If portfolio assets are ordered in such a way that
This establishes Proposition 1.
To prove Proposition 2, further restrictions are needed. The key condition for rank correlation to be an indicator of changes in investors' risk appetite is that asset returns be independent, and this condition is summarized by the diagonal variance-covariance matrix. Moreover, even when with diagonal variance-covariance matrix, the presence of common shocks such that d¾ 2 k > 0, or d¾ 2 k < 0; 8k; may lead to emergence of rank effect even when risk aversion is held constant.
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To implement this measure, one has to empirically satisfy the condition of independence of returns, and find a way to assess whether assets in the portfolio have been subject to common shocks at any given time. The first issue is dealt with in the following section. The second issue is addressed in Section 4.
6 See Misina (2003, 9) 
Orthogonalization of Returns
It is clear that the requirement of independent returns is a strong one and unlikely to satisfied empirically. As any practitioner can attest, one can prehaps find a couple of assets whose returns are uncorrelated. Finding a whole portfolio of uncorrelated assets is extremely unlikely.
We propose to circumvent this problem by orthogonalizing the set of returns on the assets comprising a given portfolio. Suppose that the portfolio under consideration consists of K assets, and let R k denote a T £ 1 vector of returns on asset k: The return matrix for the portfolio is,
The transformation proposed here is based on the fact that if the space of returns is
K¡dimensional, there will be K othrogonal linearly independent vectors spanning it.
Denote these vectors by F k : The basis vectors will be linearly independent and as such satisfy the zero cross-correlation condition. Moreover, each F k can be written as a linear combination of asset returns:
for some values of°i k : One can interpret each of the basis vectors as a derivative asset formed from the original assets. The returns on these derivative assets are a linear combination of returns on given assets. 8 For example, a derivative asset with return profile F 1 = ¡R 1 + R 2 would be obtained by going short on asset with return R 1 and long on asset with return R 2 :
The method proposed here bears close resemblance to the APT theory of Cox, Ingersoll and Ross. 9 The idea behind that theory is to postulate a linear mechanism that generates returns on all assets in the portfolio as a linear combination of a set of underlying factors. If we let R i denote returns on asset i; i = 1; :::; I; and F k the factors generating returns then the generating mechanism takes the form
It is assumed that " i ? F k ; 8k: The error term is interpreted as idiosyncratic component of returns, which represents the non-systematic risk. Factors are assumed to capture the systematic risk. In this formulation, returns are almost spanned by the factors, but not quite due to the presence of the error term. We propose to extend the dimension of the factor space so that returns are exactly spanned by factors i.e.
The procedure for finding these factors is that of the factor analysis except that in the present case the attention is not limited to the first k factors that are deemed the most important, but rather to all factors. The methodology used is the same as that of the APT but since our objectives are different we do not focus on factor loadings.Technical details and the transformation procedure are described in Appendix 1.
9 See, for example, Ross (1976) .
Benchmark Index of Risk Appetite
Using the above results, the rank correlation is computed on transformed data. Since the key condition is satisfied, we know that the results here will indicate changes in risk appetite, if any. The hypothesis H 0 : ½ S = 0 is tested using the test statistic
which, under the null, follows t distribution with K ¡ 2 degrees of freedom. 11 The shaded area in Figure 1 , where ½ S 2 [¡0:12; 0:12]; represents the values of rank corre-10 A description of the data and estimation procedure is contained in the technical appendix. 11 This is true under the assumption of bivariate normality. In a Monte Carlo study, Zimmerman, Zumbo, and Williams (2003) show that this test statistic is robust to departures from normality in tests H 0 : ½ S = 0:
lation for which H 0 cannot be rejected at 95 percent confidence level. Based on this, a broad characterization of the behaviour of investors' risk attitudes is possible. 1980s
were characterized by a relatively high appetite for risk in the early 80s, and pronounced volatility in the second half of the period. From 1989 to 1996 investors, with a couple of exceptions, displayed low appetite for risk, followed by an increased risk appetite from The index indicates that the risk appetite was generally high around the peak of the corporate bond markets and the stock market bubble in the late 1990s. On the other hand, risk appetite was in the neutral territory around the time of the stock market crash in 1987. Note that these observations are not meant to validate the index. Its validity is established by ensuring that the assumptions needed to derive the key propositions are satisfied in empirical work. Given this, the index can be used to validate our priors about investors' behaviour around these events.
Identification of common shocks
As explained in Section 2, the assumption of independent returns needs to be complemented by a method to identify common shocks in order to ensure that the index is indeed capturing changes in investors' risk appetite. This is accomplished by computing changes in riskiness on assets in the portfolio at any given time. In applying the above procedure to identify common shocks one has to bear in mind that the procedure is valid only when asset returns are independent, since only in that case does asset volatility coincide with a measure of riskiness of this asset as part of a portfolio. Furthermore, although the number of factors in our portfolio corresponds to the number original assets, factors should not be interpreted as representing individual assets. As stated earlier, each factor is a derivative asset, a linear combination of original assets comprising a portfolio.
RAI-MI and GRAI
How does the above index compare to the GRAI of Kumar and Persaud (2003) ? Figure   4 the smoothed values of both indices using the same underlying assets and procedure proposed by Kumar and Persaud (2003) . Whereas the indices more closely together, especially in the 1990s, there are some differences. For example, in the mid-80s the GRAI indicates a dramatic decrease in investors' risk appetite, whereas RAI-MI is in the neutral teritorry. In late 1980s RAI-MI moves from neutral territory to indicates lower risk appetite. GRAI follows eventually, but indicates that before a decrease in risk appetite there was a sudden and sharp increase.
Recall that the two indices use the same methodology, the only difference being that the RAI-MI is computed on transformed data so that the key condition needed to break observational equivalence holds. The difference is results gives us a sense of the sensitivity of the index to violation of the assumption of independence of returns.
The MI and GRAI suggest risk appetite was generally high in the mid-1980s, but 
RAI-MI and 'safe haven' assets
RAI-MI can also be used to assess the indicators of changes in risk appetite typically followed by market practitioners. Whereas they do not rely on a single indicator, some are typically followed more closely than others. In foreign exchange markets Swiss franc and gold are thoughts to be 'safe haven' assets. Decreases in investors' risk appetite would be reflected in purchases of these assets, which would result in increases of their respective prices.
Our index can be used to examine these indicators. If these assets act as safe haven, one would expect that the periods of low risk appetite, as indicated by RAI-MI, would be the period of high prices of these assets, and the opposite would be the case when risk appetite is high. 
Comparison with other indices
In Table 1 14 13 Of course, the price of gold, as well as any other asset, can move for reasons other than a change in investors' risk attitudes. The above analysis gives an idea about the explanatory power only for changes in risk attitudes. 14 Cf. Illing and Mayer (2005) , Table 2 . The authors provide details on computation of these indices.
Goldman Sachs Risk Aversion index and the Bank of England index are both highly correlated with RAI-MI, the correlations being 0.73 and 0.63, respectively.
The Goldman Sachs Risk Aversion Index (GS) behaves similarly to RAI-MI even though it employs an entirely different framework for measuring risk appetite. 15 One notable difference between the two series is the much sharper downward spike of the GS in August 1998, the month in which Russia defaulted on its sovereign debt catalyzing the collapse of LTCM.
FIGURE 7: GS and RAI-MI
Similarly, the index suggested by Gai and Vause (2004) behaves similarly to RAI-MI. This index extends the approach of Karampatos, Tarashev, and Tsatsaronis (2003) .
Perhaps surprisingly the results of this index differ in a marked way from the BIS results.
FIGURE 8: RAI-MI and BE
Of the remaining indices, perhaps the most conspicuous result is that related to the Investor Confidence Index of Froot and O'Connell (2003) . Correlation between this and all other indices, except for the BE, are statistically insiginficantly different from zero.
Overall, we find that the Bank of England index and the Goldman Sachs index are likely capturing changes in investors risk attitudes, whereas the situation with the remaining three indices is unclear.
15 The GS uses a standard consumption capital asset pricing model where the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of risk aversion is allowed to vary over time (Goldman Sachs, 2003) . The model incorporates monthly real US per-capita consumption, the real 3-month US Treasury bill rate, and the inflation-adjusted S&P 500 index. To convert the GS into a risk appetite index one simply multiplies by -1.
Conclusions
The profusion of indices purporting to capture changes in invetors' risk appetite and the contradictory signals they offer to investors raises the question which one of them, if any, in fact, captures changes in risk appetite. We build on the work of Kumar and Persaud (2003) and Misina (2003) and propose an index that can separate changes in prices due to changing risk attitudes from changes due to changing asset riskiness. Kumar and Persaud offer an intuitively appealing argument regarding the effects of changes in risk attitudes on asset prices in a portfolio. Misina (2003) establishes the condition under which these effects will indeed be present. The contribution of the this paper is to propose a method that can be applied to any portfolio that would empirically implement the key condition of independent return, and thus validate the interpretation of rank correlation as capturing changes in risk attitudes.
The benchmark proposed here can be used to assess the existing indices of risk appetite, or to validate our priors regarding the behavior of investors' risk attitudes during particular historical episodes. Furthermore, to the extent that financial crises and flight to liquidity can be attributed to sudden changes in investors' risk attitudes, the index can be used as an indicator of financial stability in the emerging markets.
16
16 IMF has used the version of the index proposed by Kumar and Persaud (2003 ) -see, for example IMF (2002 , 2003 .
Appendix A 7.1 Technical details of factor analysis
Starting point of factor analysis is the variance/covariance matrix V; associated with the returns matrix R: The problem is to decompose the information about covariances into its components. This is done by diagonalization of V: 17 Since V is a real symmetric matrix by construction this task is easy. 
If we choose for the columns of P the normalized orthogonal vectors of V; the diagonal entries of D will be the eigenvalues of V. It also follows that matrices D and V are similar.
The next step is to generate factors that correspond to D: This is achieved by a change of coordinates: returns are represented in the new coordinate system associated with D:
Note that from the point of view of this procedure it doesn't matter what the interpretation of the matrix elements is. In our case, it is the covariances, but the analysis is quite general, irrespective of the interpretation of the matrix.
it follows that
where F t = £ F 1t ::: F Kt ¤ This generates a set of factors associated with D.
Transformation procedure
The data is given as a series of returns on k assets:
where R k is a T £ 1 vector of returns on asset k; k = 1; :::; K:
The procedure consists of the following steps:
(i) standardize the returns data: (iv) Obtain factor loadings using the fact that at each point in time t;
Each factor's value at time t is its return, which is a linear combination of returns on existing assets. The transformed data are then given by a T £ K matrix
where
Appendix B:Data
The empirical results were obtained using foreign exchange spot and 3-month forward premiums/discounts. The data is obtained from the Bank for International Settlements, 
